1 (Proceedings heard in open court:) 2 THE COURTROOM DEPUTY: Case No. 20 CV 4985, Zhu 3 versus Ivankovich. 4 THE COURT: Good morning. Could you please --5 MR. SEARS: Good morning, your Honor. 6 THE COURT: Could you please state your names and who 7 you represent, starting with the plaintiff. 8 MR. SEARS: Yes. Good morning, your Honor. This is 9 Will Sears, Quinn Emanuel, for the plaintiffs. 10 THE COURT: Thank you. 11 MR. SCHUMACHER: Good morning, your Honor. Daryl 12 Schumacher on behalf of defendant Ivankovich. 13 THE COURT: Good morning to you. 14 I guess the state of play is the plaintiff 15 filed a motion, and then the defendant filed a response, which 16 I would strike because you're not allowed to file a response 17 until the motion is heard, but then I saw that you filed the 18 motion to withdraw that, but attached your response, and then 19 the plaintiff replied to that. 20 Do I have that straight? 21 MR. SEARS: That's correct, your Honor. 22 MR. SCHUMACHER: Your Honor --23 THE COURT: Okay. 24 Well, the whole point of hearing a motion is to kind 25 of maybe cut through some of the necessity for briefing

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    everything, so I -- I would like, if you wouldn't mind, first
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    with the plaintiff it seems to me that the major dispute
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    between the parties, and, again, I should say, I -- I really
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    didn't study the defendant's response carefully because it
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    came over the weekend, but it seemed to me from reading the
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    plaintiffs' motion that the heart of this dispute is discovery
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    of other entities besides the one that made the -- the one
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     that the plaintiff made the loan to.
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              Is that accurate?
              MR. SEARS: Your Honor, this is Will Sears, Quinn
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    Emanue1.
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              I think --
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              THE COURT: Yeah.
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              MR. SEARS: -- that is accurate. I think there's --
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     I think that's a big part of the dispute. I think there are
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     two other issues that are somewhat --
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              THE COURT: Okay.
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              MR. SEARS: -- related but a little bit distinct.
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    And those actually ---
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              THE COURT: Okay.
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              MR. SEARS: -- if it's okay with the Court, I'd like
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    to start with those other two because I think they're actually
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     fairly straightforward --
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              THE COURT: Sure, why don't you go ahead.
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              MR. SEARS:
                          Thank you.
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So the other two issues other than the Atlas organization, one is about discovery into the collateral securing these loans --

THE COURT: Mm-hmm.

MR. SEARS: -- and the other one is about litigation involving the defendant and his assets, and I'll take those in turn if that's okay.

THE COURT: Okay. Sure.

MR. SEARS: So regarding the collateral, and in terms of the specific request, it's really Request 7 and Request 8. Quite simply, these are secured loans. A big issue in the case --

THE COURT: Yeah.

MR. SEARS: -- is what the security was and what the economic value that our clients received for what the loans were.

It's come out over the past few months and even in defendant's response at Page 5 is that they think the collateral is basically worthless. The collateral is largely distributions from this entity called Overlook that the defendant controls. He's now taken the position that Overlook is not making any distributions. In other words, there's no money coming out of it so the collateral, to his view, isn't worth anything.

We think that's a huge (inaudible) the case. If

that's correct, the economic bargain that our client struck was much different from what they realized, and we're just trying to get some basic discovery into how it came to be that what was pledged as collateral really has no value now that the loans are in default.

THE COURT: How -- sorry -- hold on for a second.

(Dog barking in background.)

THE COURT: Okay. Sorry about that.

So what -- how long a time was it between the loan being made and this acknowledgment that the collateral or your discovery of the collateral that secured that loan was basically worthless? What's the timeframe we're talking about?

MR. SEARS: So there's two loans here, very similar structures for both. One from plaintiff ZZH, Zhu Zhai Holding, one from plaintiff Lee. The loans were made respectively in late 2018, early 2019. I don't have the exact --

(Cross-talking.)

THE COURT: That's okay. That gives me enough. Okay. Go ahead.

MR. SEARS: When we found out that the collateral was nothing was really after the loans defaulted, which was this summer. Again, slightly different maturity dates, but the ZZH loan matured June 15, 2020. The Lee loan matured July 31st,

2020.

It was after that when our client sought to enforce their rights that we started hearing that, well, there's been no distributions from this entity. And one of the things we pleaded in our complaint is that we think that there may have been things that were effectively distributions but were perhaps called something else, and that those were misappropriated, which would be a breach of the limited guaranty agreement, but to figure out what exactly happened and to what extent those were breached and if there were any distributions by a different name and they were -- something else was done with them, we'd really need some basic discovery into the collateral.

THE COURT: Okay.

So basically you're -- with respect to this argument, you're arguing and you're contending basically that Overlook, which is now essentially bust -- might be bust because of misappropriations of the funds (inaudible).

MR. SEARS: Kind of, although I think it's a little more subtle. It's not clear to us really whether it's bust or what the deal is.

One thing that we learned, again, just after we filed the lawsuit and was in defendant's response at Page 5, is this Overlook entity apparently doesn't even have a bank account, which is very concerning to us.

1 As the defendant notes, he's produced a balance sheet It's hard for us to understand how it has a 2 for Overlook. 3 balance sheet but no bank account and how its distributions 4 were pledged as collateral if it has no account from which it 5 can make those. 6 THE COURT: Okay. And so what exactly are you 7 looking for? 8 MR. SEARS: I think this would be Request 7. We've asked for --9 10 THE COURT: Uh-huh. 11 MR. SEARS: -- all documents regarding the 12 collateral, and we give some specific examples. 13 I think on this, and really all of these requests, 14 your Honor, we're willing to be reasonable here. We don't 15 think --16 THE COURT: Yeah. 17 MR. SEARS: -- this is a million-document case. We 18 don't want discovery to go on for years and years. 19 THE COURT: Right. 20 MR. SEARS: This is something where we could take --21 we could take documents sufficient to show or we could come up 22 with a narrow set of search terms. 23 What we're concerned about is the scenario that we're 24 in now, where the defendant is selectively disclosing bits and 25 pieces of information but without a full picture. So we see a

1 balance sheet, but we don't understand what that means because 2 there's no bank account to go with it. 3 THE COURT: Uh-huh, uh-huh. 4 Defendant, why don't you tell me what's wrong 5 with that idea? 6 MR. SCHUMACHER: Thank you, your Honor. 7 THE COURT: I think -- you challenged relevance 8 primarily as I recall, correct? 9 MR. SCHUMACHER: That's correct, your Honor. 10 THE COURT: Okay. 11 Why isn't this relevant? 12 MR. SCHUMACHER: So I guess the first thing I would 13 disagree with is the conclusion that counsel made that their 14 collateral is worthless. This portfolio has an entity called 15 Overlook Managing Member at sort of the top of the 16 organization. 17 Below Overlook are five operating entities referred 18 to as the program entities. 19 THE COURT: Uh-huh. 20 MR. SCHUMACHER: That's -- and then there are 21 entities below that as well. Their collateral are 22 distribution rights from Overlook. Simply because Overlook 23 isn't distributing assets doesn't mean the collateral is 24 worthless. I think that's a false --25 THE COURT: But aren't -- okay. But aren't you sort

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    of proving their point a little bit when you say that? I
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    mean --
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              MR. SCHUMACHER: Well, your Honor --
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              THE COURT: -- you're contending one thing about
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    Outlook, and the plaintiff is contending an entirely different
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    thing, and it seems to me the only way to get to the bottom of
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    whether this -- you know, what the evidence is on these
    allegations is to give them this information.
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              MR. SCHUMACHER: Judge, what we've given them already
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    are bank accounts for all of the Pilgrim entities, as well as
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    the balance sheet for Overlook, which is at the top.
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              You know, I think the dispute is some of the things
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    they're looking for are deep, deep into this portfolio
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    beyond -- again, keeping in mind their collateral are just the
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    distribution rights. They want documents about refinancing
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    and very extensive ---
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              THE COURT: Yeah, but -- but essentially they want to
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    test what you're saying --
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              MR. SCHUMACHER: Understood.
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              THE COURT: -- right?
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              MR. SCHUMACHER: And I think they want to test what
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    we're saying --
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              THE COURT: What's the problem?
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              MR. SCHUMACHER: -- give them --
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              THE COURT: I mean, take your word for it on that
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1 particular point, it seems to me given the allegations in the 2 case, so --3 MR. SCHUMACHER: Judge --4 THE COURT: -- go ahead. Go ahead. 5 MR. SCHUMACHER: I'm not asking them to take my word 6 for it. We've given them all the bank accounts and the 7 operating -- I'm sorry, and the balance sheet for the 8 top-level entity. And I'm not suggesting that, you know, maybe there's 9 10 some additional documents they'd be entitled to, but they seem 11 to want everything for the entire portfolio and relative to 12 the -- you know, the distribution rights from the top-level 13 entity that they're entitled to, I just think it's -- it's way 14 beyond the realm of anything that could be relevant. 15 burden is --16 THE COURT: Well, that's -- I mean, I heard the 17 plaintiffs say that they were willing try to come up with some 18 way to limit this discovery to test exactly what you're 19 saying, and it seems to me from even your -- I mean, I read it 20 briefly, but even your position is that -- well, you're 21 basically sort of closing the door on that --22 MR. SCHUMACHER: I just think that there's --23 THE COURT: -- as automatically -- it's automatically 24 not relevant, and I don't agree with that premise. 25 So it seems -- really, it doesn't make sense to me.

But I do understand that this is -- this is a, you know, a complicated series of companies, but I don't agree that it should be just not negotiable in terms of relevance. So I think the best thing to do here is to have you guys talking this through.

I don't think just saying stop is sufficient, and I don't think if the balance sheet for Outlook is basically not backed up by even a bank account, that suggests to me that something more complicated is going on with respect to these entities.

And I thought I read that the plaintiffs -- I guess plaintiff pointed out that there was testimony, you know, money kind of moved around in and among these entities, which makes it more likely that there's something there.

I agree with you, and I think the plaintiff agrees with you, that there should be limitations on this discovery, and they've offered to try to negotiate that, but essentially you put up a stop sign.

MR. SCHUMACHER: Your Honor, my only point is I don't think they get unfettered access to the entirety of this portfolio --

THE COURT: I don't think they're asking -- I don't think they're asking for unfettered access. I think they're asking -- you know, what I'm saying is you just said no.

Now, you're only giving -- you're only giving

1 information concerning this particular transaction and what 2 backs it up, but that doesn't -- I mean, I think that the 3 allegations kind of go beyond that. 4 MR. SCHUMACHER: Okay. And just for the record, 5 there is no allegation that there was misappropriation that 6 caused Outlook to be --7 THE COURT: No, there was allegations that there was 8 fraud and intentional misrepresentation about --9 MR. SCHUMACHER: The portfolio, the inducement to the 10 loan is what they're arguing. This is just the collateral to 11 the loan. The fraud that counsel has alleged is fraudulent 12 inducement to a loan. 13 THE COURT: Yeah, and what exactly would that be? 14 MR. SCHUMACHER: I guess my point, your Honor, is 15 they're not alleging misappropriate or fraud within this 16 portfolio of companies. They're alleging that a separate 17 loan, which is the subject of the lawsuit, they were 18 fraudulently induced into, indeed distribution rights served 19 as collateral. That's all. 20 THE COURT: Okay. But --21 MR. SCHUMACHER: I understand your ruling though, I 22 understand --23 THE COURT: Well, let me ask the plaintiff, what 24 about that? What about what he just said? 25 MR. SEARS: Yes, your Honor. I think we don't agree

with that characterization of our complaint. I've got it open in front of me, and there are -
THE COURT: Yeah.

MR. SEARS: -- numerous places where we've alleged

MR. SEARS: -- numerous places where we've alleged that he misappropriated distributions. We say it in Paragraph 6 in the preliminary statement of the complaint.

THE COURT: Yeah.

MR. SEARS: We say it in Paragraph (inaudible). It' repeated throughout. In fact, one of our (inaudible) is of the limited guaranties that we plead is that he misappropriated distributions because under the guaranties, that is one of the triggers that renders defendant liable.

THE COURT: Yeah.

MR. SEARS: He misappropriated distributions. So it's within the four corners of the complaint, and he didn't move to dismiss it.

THE COURT: All right.

Well, that was my sense, too, so I'm just not understanding why this should be, you know, a forbidden topic. I think -- you know what my feelings are, and I think you guys need to, as the plaintiff actually suggested, get together and figure out how to streamline this so that you're getting at exactly what it is, what is relevant to these allegations because I don't think they want every document from every entity, every -- that's not what I -- that's not how I read

what they're saying.

But I also think that you've stymied that by just sort of taking these issues, which seem very germane to what the complaint says, just off the table, and you're not going to do that. That's not going to fly I guess is what I'm saying. I don't agree with that basic premise.

I do agree that there could be overbreadth issues and they should be negotiated, and I'm going to order you to do that with respect to these particular documents because I don't think that negotiation has taken place.

Am I correct?

MR. SCHUMACHER: Your Honor, we've had a telephonic meet-and-confer. The big issue was we're going to negotiate search terms. It's going to be an electronic type of review, but obviously we have some significant scope issues, one of which you've just resolved.

But once we get past, in my view, the two big issues, I know counsel has identified it as three, I think we can negotiate search terms if you so order.

THE COURT: Okay.

So when you do do that, you're going to do it face to face. And what I mean by that is you're going to either have a Zoom or Teams or other video platform meeting so that you can talk directly to each other and get to the bottom.

It seems to me that's more effective than chatting on

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the telephone and sending emails back and forth. frankly, my standing order requires it. Now we can't do it actually in person. We can certainly do it via these platforms. So let's get to the litigation involving 0kav. defendants. What's the relevance of that, plaintiffs? MR. SEARS: Thank you, your Honor. And I'm sorry, I don't mean to belabor the point, but I just had one clarification on the collateral. THE COURT: Uh-huh. MR. SEARS: So Request 8 is related to the collateral. The collateral securing the Lee loan includes proceeds from refinancing another loan from a third party called Walker Dunlop. I just want to confirm that the Court's order applies to that, and it's subject --THE COURT: Agree. MR. SEARS: -- to a face to face -- thank you. THE COURT: Yeah, agree. Really, what I want you to focus on, and I'm stressing this to you, that just because I ruled it relevant doesn't mean that you get everything you want. You need to get really in good faith negotiate a scope of this particular material. Okay. So let's get to the litigation. MR. SEARS: Thank you.

So, your Honor, I think the litigation issue is as follows: Under Section 9 of both guaranty agreements, the defendant made express representations that there were no pending or threatened legal proceedings against him personally or any of the defendant's assets that would have a material adverse impact on him if adversely determined.

So it's an express representation. The breach of it would trigger the limited guaranties, and we know, your Honor, that that representation was not true because when he signed at least one of the loans -- the guaranty agreements, there was already a lawsuit on file against them, which has since been resolved against the defendant and he's now currently facing a judgment in that case.

So these litigation requests really all go to that issue. We think they're clearly relevant to whether he breached that express representation in the guaranty, and for this one, we don't see any plausible burden objection because it's essentially just a list of lawsuits involving the defendant or his assets. We'll be reasonable on the timeframe we're looking for. I don't think it can just be as of the date that he signed the guaranties because the guaranties are broader than that.

They speak in terms of threatened litigation. They could also contemplate cases in which maybe the defendant or one of his entities is a plaintiff but sort of sued first for

some tactical reason.

THE COURT: Yeah, yeah.

MR. SEARS: So we're happy to work that out similar to the guidance the Court provided, but we don't think a categorical relevance objection or even really significant narrowing of these requests is appropriate, given that it's within the four corners of the guaranty.

THE COURT: Remind me what your time frame was?

MR. SEARS: When we asked for this, I think we asked for documents and a list of the lawsuits from 2017 to the present. We'd be willing to narrow that. Our understanding --

THE COURT: Yeah, I do think -- yeah, I do think you do need to narrow that.

I understand why you can't just say, you know, on the day of the -- of the closing because, you know, threatened litigation is actually something that needs to be covered, and you can't really do that by, you know, essentially limiting the request (inaudible).

But I do think the timeframe is pretty narrow. I don't think 2017 to the present by any means, so I'd like you to negotiate that.

What does the defendant think an appropriate timeframe for this would be?

MR. SCHUMACHER: Judge, if we're trying to capture

threatened and pending at the time he signed these documents, which I agree is appropriate, six months before and six months after would be fine.

Your Honor, my issue is not with what we've just discussed. I have two issues with this. One, the guaranty, where he makes the representations are with respect to himself and the language "his assets" is in there. I think what -- what plaintiffs have requested is a problem in two respects: One, they're requesting litigation for any of the 50-plus Atlas entities; and, two, they're not just requesting the listing of it. They're asking for all documents involved in any case, and that --

THE COURT: Well, I -- I don't mean to cut you off, but that's an overbreadth issue, which should be, as I said, negotiated in good faith by the parties, and that needs to take place.

I read assets pretty broadly though. Why wouldn't the defendant's personal assets -- rather entity assets count?

MR. SCHUMACHER: Well, those are -- those are entities in which he has a membership interest, but --

THE COURT: Well, that's an asset, is it not, by any definition? I mean, it just is.

Like, again, this is -- to me, this is more a scope issue than a relevance. I mean, I think -- you know, I'm not faulting you. I don't think, you know, you've -- there's been

a lot of discovery in this case, you know, things have been turned over and so on and so forth.

But just basically not really negotiating this, just saying it's off the table doesn't make sense to it. Atlas is a broad term, and I think it encompasses membership interests in other assets or other entities, which it does.

Plaintiff, what do you think about the timeframe?

MR. SEARS: Thank you, your Honor.

THE COURT: Six months before and six after?

MR. SEARS: I think that's close. If it's okay with the Court, I think what we'd like to do is think about it and talk it over with Mr. Schumacher. The six months before sounds about right.

I guess our concern with six months after is that we're already aware of lawsuits that were hitting the docket and potentially even proceedings involving some of the defendants' personal assets that may have come about more than six months after, but for some of them and one of them we identify in our Requests for Production is a lawsuit the defendant initiated over a foreclosure sale of one of his portfolios of properties. Those things don't just come out of the blue. There are usually pre-default notices and discussions. I think we would --

THE COURT: Yeah.

MR. SEARS: -- want to make sure that whatever

timeframe we agree on, we're not losing emails that say we are concerned you're going to default and we're going to sue you for a lot of money just because it happens to be on month seven.

THE COURT: Mm-hmm. Again, also, okay, that topic should also be negotiated between the parties. I can see going a little beyond six months, maybe nine months. I just don't think the timeframe of 2017 to present is really -- is really appropriate.

So, again, you can add this to your list of things to do in your conference.

So what's the third issue?

MR. SEARS: Judge, before we move on, could I get one point of clarification?

THE COURT: Sure.

MR. SCHUMACHER: I think some guidance would be helpful on, you know, identifying litigation is one thing, but one piece of litigation involves, as your Honor's aware, many, many, many documents. I don't think they're necessary. Maybe the complaint is necessary, but if you can just give us some guidance because I know we're going to be negotiating that.

THE COURT: Well, I actually think, I actually think this is more -- I mean, this is your case. You both know more about it than I do. I don't -- I'm not going to tell you with respect to, you know, all litigation, you know, what exactly

should be produced because it depends, and I think you guys are a better -- in a better place than I am to draw those kinds of distinctions.

And I think what happened in this case, which is unfortunate, is those negotiations really didn't happen because you sort of took this off the table with respect to other -- you know, other entities, and now you're going to have to, like, understanding that I don't think that bars this discovery, you're going to have to negotiate about it.

And this is why I have my rule because it seems to me, you know, briefing those isn't great, but you get more to the bottom of this by talking, and what I think was really important for me to say is that I think these relevance objections are not appropriate. What is appropriate is overbreadth with respect to some of the requests. I totally see that.

But how that gets -- how that gets, you know, resolved is really going to depend on your negotiations.

If at the end of your -- of your discussions you've made a lot of progress but there are a few things that you just need a ruling on, I'll do that.

But I'm not going to do it now because you haven't done, in my mind, the hard work that is required to actually bring this -- you know, bring this to the Court for an actual ruling by sort of taking it off the table, and now you know

you can't do that. So it seems to me -- and now the plaintiff knows that they need to narrow, but I think the plaintiff has sort of always been willing to do that, but you can't get there if you just, like I say, put a stop sign on it.

So what's the third issue? I've got to move on. I've got other people.

MR. SEARS: Understood, your Honor. I'll try to be brief.

The third issue is the Atlas organization. That one I think is the one that's been briefed the most heavily, and I think your Honor actually identified the key allegations here.

We allege in Paragraph 56 of our complaint that the defendant testified under oath that he's moved money between his entities and has the ability to do so, and we also alleged and the defendant has admitted in his answer that one of the things that was shown to our client during the preloan discussions was projections and decks showing asset values for different entities and portfolios of properties owned by different Atlas entities, and the defendants can make arguments at summary judgment as to why those are or aren't actionable, but because they were some of the materials given to our clients and we concluded they were some of the inducements for this loan, we think that discovery into the financial condition of the Atlas organization generally is relevant.

This isn't a business that observes hard-and-fast corporate distinctions. It's just not. The whole point of the transaction and the materials that were shown to our clients was that there were other entities that owned other assets that produced income, and that was always on the table as part of the deal.

THE COURT: Uh-huh. What do you say to that, defendant?

MR. SCHUMACHER: Your Honor, I think there are two Atlas entities involved here, which, by the way, they're not suing. They're suing the guarantor. There are over 50 Atlas entities that all are involved in real estate operations.

I made a proportionality argument. I think also many of the other Atlas entities that weren't a borrower, weren't a guarantor, and quite frankly had no relevance to this transaction are -- you know, discovery as to those entities, which would be extremely burdensome, the relevance is disproportionate to the value in this case.

THE COURT: Well, normally I would agree with you, but what your client said under oath gives me pause.

What do you have to say about that?

MR. SCHUMACHER: I think it's taken out of context. It wasn't relating to any of these entities, and what he was saying was he's the managing member of many of the LLCs, but --

1 THE COURT: How was it taken out of context exactly? 2 MR. SCHUMACHER: Because it was with respect to -- it 3 was in one case in New York with respect to one particular 4 issue. 5 THE COURT: Plaintiff, what's your answer? 6 MR. SEARS: Your Honor, I think that we don't agree 7 that it was taken out of context. I'm sure that won't I think -surprise the Court. 9 THE COURT: No, it does not. 10 MR. SEARS: -- going back and forth -- I think going 11 back and forth over how to interpret something that the 12 defendant said under oath in another lawsuit is a summary 13 judgment Rule 56 argument, not a Rule 26 argument. 14 We've pleaded that he doesn't observe corporate 15 formalities. We've pleaded that to induce our clients to make 16 the loans, he gave them projections about asset values for 17 properties owned by other Atlas entities and that those were 18 material and something they relied on as part of the deal. 19 He can make arguments at summary judgment as to why 20 that doesn't give rise to the claim. For now, we think it's 21 fair game for discovery. 22 I hear the Court and defense counsel on the burden Frankly, we don't want millions of documents from 50 23 issues. 24 different companies --25 THE COURT: No, I don't expect -- I'm sorry, I

interrupted. I don't expect you do. I don't know why you would want them.

MR. SEARS: Exactly. I think what we want, though, is in an organization where literally every entity is called Atlas blank LLC, we don't want documents about the defendant's financial condition or the financial condition of his organization generally to get left on the cutting room floor because they just say Atlas or they say --

THE COURT: Right.

MR. SEARS: -- your financial troubles and they reference an LLC that maybe wasn't the borrower in this case; but as your Honor has noted, I really think that's a search term and custodians issue. It's not a relevance issue.

THE COURT: Yeah, I don't think it's a relevance issue either, but I never thought of the proportionality of the discovery. And, again, that's something you have a better idea about in terms of solving that problem than do I at this point.

So, again, I need you to discuss it. So what I would like you to do is take, you know, I don't know how long you need, maybe a week, maybe two weeks, to have this discussion and try to resolve sort of the burden issues that are part of -- and timeframe with respect to litigation that are part of each of these separate issues, and what you can't agree on, and I really hope it ends up being nothing, but if you can't

agree on it, you'll -- I would -- what I typically do (inaudible) but I order the conference and then order at the end of the conference you file a joint submission as to what remains for the Court to resolve, and it should be fairly narrow with respect to each of these.

So that's what I'm going to do with this. So how long do you think it will take you to have the meet-and-confer?

MR. SCHUMACHER: Your Honor, this is Daryl Schumacher.

I have an appellate argument later this week, so if we could make two weeks part of the suggestion.

THE COURT: Yeah, okay. That's fine.

So you have 14 days to have your meet-and-confer by video, and then you can file (inaudible) let's say seven days, and it's a joint submission, specifically defining what you were not able to agree on, and -- and as I said, I would hope in a good-faith negotiation, now that you've gotten something from the Court, you would be able to resolve many of these issues.

So that will be the Court's order today. Like I said, the submission should be joint, and if you want to, you can say a little bit about what your position is each, but, again, I hope that those will be relatively -- you won't have a lot of those.

1	And if we do, then you're just going to have me make
2	a call, and that, really, I always tell people, cases like
3	that, you know the landscape a lot better than I will ever do,
4	but to some extent when you present me with, you know, these
5	kinds of issues, it's really going to be, you know, I don't
6	want to say arbitrary, but I'm just going to take my best
7	whack at it, and you're going to have to live with the
8	results.
9	So I often think what the parties can negotiate
10	themselves is more valuable. But, again, that's the order for
11	today. Okay, is everybody clear? I have to move on to the
12	next case.
13	MR. SCHUMACHER: Yes, your Honor.
14	MR. SEARS: Yes, your Honor. Thank you.
15	THE COURT: All right. Thank you very much.
16	Bye-bye.
17	(Which were all the proceedings heard.)
18	CERTIFICATE
19	I certify that the foregoing is a correct transcript from
20	the digital recording of proceedings in the above-entitled
21	matter to the best of my ability, given the limitations of
22	using a digital-recording system.
23	/s/Kathleen M. Fennell March 22, 2021
24	Kathleen M. Fennell Date
25	Official Court Reporter